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Abstract
Guttman presented a model-theoretic approach to establishing se-
curity goals in the context of strand space theory. In his approach, a
run of the Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (cpsa) produces
models that determine if a goal is satisfied.
This paper presents a method for extracting a sentence that com-
pletely characterizes a run of cpsa. Logical deduction can then be
used to determine if a goal is satisfied. This method has been imple-
mented and is available to all.
1 Introduction
This revision updates the strand-oriented protocol language described in Sec-
tion 3 to one that has been shown to be useful in practice. The November
2014 revision of the January 2012 paper corrects several minor errors and
adds a description of a node-oriented protocol language in Appendix B.
A central problem in cryptographic protocol analysis is to determine
whether a formula that expresses a security goal about behaviors compat-
ible with a protocol is true. Following [6], a security goal is a quantified
implication:
∀~x(Φ0 ⊃
∨
1≤i≤n
∃~yiΦi). (1)
The hypothesis Φ0 is a conjunction of atomic formulas describing regular
(honest) behavior. Each disjunct Φi that makes up the conclusion is also
a conjunction of atomic formulas. When Φi describes desired behaviors of
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other regular participants, then the formula is an authentication goal. The
goal says that each run of the protocol compatible with Φ0 will include the
regular behavior described by one of the disjuncts. When n = 0, the goal’s
conclusion is false. If Φ0 mentions an unwanted disclosure, (1) says the
disclosure cannot occur, thus a security goal with n = 0 expresses a secrecy
goal.
Guttman [6] presented a model-theoretic approach to establishing secu-
rity goals in the context of strand space theory. In that setting, a skeleton
describes regular behaviors compatible with a protocol. For skeleton k and
formula Φ, he defined k, α |= Φ to mean that the conjunction of atomic
formulas that make up Φ is satisfied in k with variable assignment α.
A realized skeleton is one that includes enough regular behavior to spec-
ify all the non-adversarial part of an execution of the protocol. In a realized
skeleton, its message transmissions combined with possible adversarial be-
havior explain every message reception in the skeleton.
In strand space theory, a homomorphism is a structure-preserving map δ
that shows how the behaviors in one skeleton are reflected within another.
As skeletons serve as models, homomorphisms preserve satisfaction for con-
junctions of atomic formulas.
The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer (cpsa) constructs homo-
morphisms from a skeleton k0 to realized skeletons [9]. If cpsa termi-
nates, it generates a set of realized skeletons ki and a set of homomorphisms
δi : k0 7→ ki. These realized skeletons are all the minimal, essentially different
skeletons that are homomorphic images of k0 and are called the shapes of the
analysis.
Guttman proposed a recipe for evaluating goal (1) based on the following
two technical results.
• For any security hypothesis Φ0 there is a skeleton k0 that characterizes
it in the sense that for all k:
∃α k, α |= Φ0 iff ∃δ δ : k0 7→ k
• There exists a realized skeleton that is a counterexample to (1) iff there
exists some shape in the analysis of k0 that is a counterexample.
These two results justify the following procedure.
1. Construct a characteristic skeleton k0 for Φ0.
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2. Ask cpsa for the shapes produced by analyzing k0.
3. As cpsa delivers shapes, check that each satisfies some disjunct Φi.
4. If the answer is no, this shape is a counterexample to (1).
5. If cpsa terminates with no counterexample, then (1) is achieved.
Implementing Security Goals. cpsa now has support for security goals,
but not as specified by Guttman. Part of the reason for the difference is that
the details of the formalism that underlies the cpsa implementation [11]
dictate changes to the logic of security goals. These details will be elaborated
later in this paper.
The key difference is a change in perspective. Instead of finding a formula
that characterizes a security hypothesis, cpsa includes a tool that extracts
a sentence that characterizes a shape analysis. This so called shape analysis
sentence is special in that it encodes everything that can be learned from the
shape analysis.
Given a shape analysis sentence, a security goal is achieved if the goal
can be deduced from the sentence. cpsa includes a Prolog program that
translates shape analysis sentences into Prover9 [8] syntax. Typically, a goal
that is a theorem is quickly proved by Prover9.
There is another advantage to this approach. It can be tedious to generate
security goals. Realistic ones can be large and complicated. An easy way
to create one is to modify a shape analysis sentence. This typically involves
deleting parts of the conclusion.
There is a disadvantage to this approach. When a goal cannot be de-
duced from a shape analysis sentence, one cannot conclude that there is a
counterexample. It could be simply that the sentence is not relevant to the
security goal.
Motivating Example. The running example used throughout this paper
is now presented. An informal version of the example is presented here, and
the example with all of the details filled is in Section 4.
The following protocol is a simplified version of the Denning-Sacco key
distribution protocol [4] due to Bruno Blanchet [1].
A→ B : {|{|s|}a−1|}b
B → A : {|d|}s
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Alice (A) freshly generates symmetric key s, signs the symmetric key with
her private uncompromised asymmetric key a−1 and intends to encrypt it
with Bob’s (B) uncompromised asymmetric key b. Alice expects to receive
data d encrypted, such that only Alice and Bob have access to it.
The protocol was constructed with a known flaw for expository purposes,
and as a result the secret is exposed due to an authentication failure. The
protocol does not prevent Alice from using a compromised key b′, so that
Mallory (M) can perform this man-in-the-middle attack:
A→M : {|{|s|}a−1 |}b′
M → B : {|{|s|}a−1 |}b
B → E : {|d|}s
The protocol fails to provide a means for Bob to ensure the original
message was encrypted using his key. The authentication failure is avoided
with this variation of the protocol:
A→ B : {|{|s, b|}a−1 |}b
B → A : {|d|}s
(2)
In strand space theory, a strand is a linearly ordered sequence of events
e0 ⇒ · · · ⇒ en−1, and an event is either a message transmission • → or a
reception • ←. In cpsa, adversarial behavior is not explicitly represented,
so strands always represent regular behavior.
Regular behavior is constrained by a set of roles that make up the proto-
col. In this protocol, Alice’s behaviors must be compatible with an initiator
role, and Bob’s behaviors follow a responder role.
init
•

// {|{|s|}a−1 |}b
• {|d|}soo
resp
{|{|s|}a−1 |}b // •

{|d|}s •oo
(3)
The important authentication goal from Bob’s perspective is that if an
instance of a responder role runs to completion, there must have been an
instance of the initiator role that transmitted its first message. Furthermore,
assuming the symmetric key is freshly generated, and the private keys are
uncompromised, the two strands agree on keys used for signing and encryp-
tion.
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A cpsa analysis of the authentication goal requires two inputs, a speci-
fication of the roles that make up the protocol, as in Eq. 3, and a question
about runs of the protocol. The question in this case is the hypothesis of
Eq. 4, that an instance of the responder role ran to completion. In these
diagrams, a strand instantiated from a role is distinguished from a role by
placing messages above communication arrows, and ≻ is used to assert an
event occurred after another.
resp
•

{|{|s|}
a−1
|}b
oo
•
{|d|}s
//
implies
resp init
•

≻
{|{|s|}
a−1
|}b
oo •
{|{|s|}
a−1
|}
b′
oo
•
{|d|}s
//
(4)
cpsa produces the conclusion in Eq. 4, that an instance of the initiator
role must have transmitted its first message, but it does not conclude that
the strands agree on the key used for the outer encryption. When cpsa is
run using the amended protocol in Eq. 2, the strands agree on the key, and
the authentication goal is achieved.
The contribution of this paper is a method of formalizing security goals
and the results of a cpsa analysis in first-order logic such that whenever
a cpsa analysis demonstrates that a security goal is achieved, the logical
sentence associated with the security goal will be deducible from the shape
analysis sentence with the relevant cpsa analysis. The sentences associated
with this example are presented in Section 4.
Some Related Work. This paper is the result of implementing security
goals as described in Guttman [6]. The original motivation for extracting
shape analysis sentences rather than following the procedure in [6] was ease
of implementation. With shape analysis sentences, most of the work is per-
formed by a post-processing stage, and there were only a few changes made
to the core cpsa program. Only later it was realized the sense in which shape
analysis sentences completely characterize a shape analysis.
The Scyther tool [2] integrates security goal verification with its core
protocol analysis algorithm. Security goals are easy to state as long as they
can be expressed using a predefined vocabulary, however, there is no sense
in which Scyther goals characterize an analysis.
The Protocol Composition Logic [3] provides a contrasting approach to
specifying security goals. It extends strand spaces by adding an operational
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Sorts: ⊤, A, S, D
Subsorts: A < ⊤, S < ⊤, D < ⊤
Operations: (·, ·) : ⊤×⊤ → ⊤ Pairing
{| · |}(·) : ⊤× A→ ⊤ Asymmetric encryption
{| · |}(·) : ⊤× S→ ⊤ Symmetric encryption
(·)−1 : A→ A Asymmetric key inverse
(·)−1 : S→ S Symmetric key inverse
Equations: (x−1)−1 = x for x : A
y−1 = y for y : S
Figure 1: Simple Crypto Algebra Signature
semantics as a small set of reduction rules, and a run of a protocol is a
sequence of reduction steps derived from an initial configuration. The logic
is a temporal logic interpreted over runs. The logic is more expressive than
what is described within this paper at the cost of added complexity.
Structure of this Paper. Section 2 describes the formalism on which
cpsa is built, Section 3 presents the logic built upon that formalism, and
Section 4 displays the example above in full detail.
Notation. A finite sequence is a function from an initial segment of the
natural numbers. The length of a sequence X is |X|, and sequence X =
〈X(0), . . . , X(n − 1)〉 for n = |X|. If S is a set, then S∗ is the set of finite
sequences over S, and S+ is the non-empty finite sequences over S. The
prefix of sequence X of length n is X † n.
2 Message Algebras and Homomorphisms
The two details of cpsa’s formalism that dictate changes to the logic of
security goals are the fact that in cpsa, a message algebra is an order-sorted
quotient term algebra and homomorphisms are strand-oriented, not node-
oriented. The issues surrounding homomorphisms will be described later.
An order-sorted algebra is a generalization of a many-sorted algebra in
which sorts may be partially ordered [5]. The carrier sets associated with
ordered sorts are related by the subset relation.
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Figure 1 shows the simplification of the cpsa message algebra signature
used by the examples in this paper. Sort ⊤ is the sort of all messages. Mes-
sages of sort A (asymmetric keys), sort S (symmetric keys), and sort D (data)
are called atoms. Messages are generated from the atoms using encryption
{| · |}(·) and pairing (·, ·), where the comma operation is right associative and
parentheses are omitted when the context permits.
Each variable x in an order-sorted term has a unique sort S. The decla-
ration of x is x : S. The set of variables that occur in term t is Vars(t).
The quotient term algebra generated by declarations X over the signature
in Figure 1 is written AX . It is the carrier set of sort ⊤. The canonical
representative of each member of AX is the term with the fewest occurrences
of the (·)−1 operation. Unification and matching can be implemented in such
a way that only canonical terms are considered [10, Appendix B].
A message t0 is carried by t1, written t0 ⊑ t1 if t0 can be derived from t1
given the right set of keys, that is ⊑ is the smallest reflexive, transitive
relation such that t0 ⊑ t0, t0 ⊑ (t0, t1), t1 ⊑ (t0, t1), and t0 ⊑ {|t0|}t1 .
The use of a message algebra that is order-sorted dictates that the logic
used to express the characteristic sentence associated with a shape analysis
is also order-sorted. Furthermore, the signature for the logic must inherit
the sorts and subsort relations from the message algebra.
Implementation-Oriented Strand Spaces. A run of a protocol is viewed
as an exchange of messages by a finite set of local sessions of the protocol.
Each local session is called a strand [12]. The behavior of a strand, its trace,
is a non-empty sequence of messaging events. An event is either a message
transmission or a reception. Outbound message t ∈ AX is written as +t, and
inbound message t is written as −t. A message originates in a trace if it is
carried by some event and the first event in which it is carried is outbound.
A strand space ΘX is a finite map from a set of strands to their traces.
cpsa represents a set of strands as an initial segment of the natural numbers,
therefore, a strand space is a sequence of traces. The nodes of a strand space
are nodes(ΘX) = {(s, i) | s ∈ Dom(ΘX), 0 ≤ i < |ΘX(s)|}. The event at
node n = (s, i) is evtΘ(s, i) = Θ(s)(i).
In a strand space, a message that originates in exactly one trace is uniquely
originating, and represents a freshly chosen value. A message that originates
nowhere and is never used by the adversary to decrypt or encrypt a message
is non-originating, and represents an uncompromised key.
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A protocol P is a finite set of traces, which are the roles of the protocol.
Strand s ∈ Dom(ΘX) is an elaboration of role r ∈ P if ΘX(s) is a prefix of
the result of applying some substitution σ to r. An example of a protocol is
in Eq. 6 in Section 4.
Skeletons. A skeleton represents all or part of the regular portion of an
execution. A skeleton contains a strand space, a partial ordering of its nodes,
assumptions about uncompromised keys and freshly generated atoms, and
role associations.
A skeleton k = kX(rl , P,ΘX,≺, N, U), where rl : Dom(ΘX)→ P is a role
map, ≺ is a strict partial ordering of the nodes, N is a set of atoms, none
of which originate in a trace in ΘX , and U is a set of atoms, all of which
originate in no more than one trace in ΘX . In addition, ≺ must order the
node for each event that receives a uniquely originating atom after the node
of its transmission, so as to model the idea that the atom represents a value
freshly generated when it is transmitted.
The above definition of a skeleton is useful for defining the semantics of
shape analysis sentences, but it does not reflect the syntax used by cpsa.
In cpsa syntax, the trace and the role associated with a strand is specified
by an instance. An instance is of the form i(r, h, σ), where r is a role, h
specifies the length of a trace instantiated from the role, and σ specifies how
to instantiate the variables in the role to obtain the trace. Thus the trace
associated with i(r, h, σ) is σ ◦ r † h, the prefix of length h that results from
applying σ to r.
In the cpsa syntax, the role map and sequence of traces are replaced
by a sequence of instances. So for skeleton kX(rl , P,ΘX ,≺, N, U), the cpsa
syntax is kX(P, I,≺, N, U), where for each s ∈ Dom(ΘX), I(s) = i(r, h, σ),
r = rl(s), and the trace of i(r, h, σ) is ΘX(s).
Two examples of skeletons are displayed in Figure 2 in Section 4.
Homomorphisms. Let k0 = kX(rl0, P,Θ0,≺0, N0, U0) and k1 = kY (rl1, P,
Θ1,≺1, N1, U1) be skeletons. There is a skeleton homomorphism (φ, σ) : k0 7→
k1 if φ and σ are maps with the following properties:
1. φ maps strands of k0 into those of k1, and nodes as φ((s, i)) = (φ(s), i),
that is φ is in Dom(Θ0)→ Dom(Θ1);
2. σ : AX → AY is a message algebra homomorphism;
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3. n ∈ nodes(Θ0) implies σ(evtΘ0(n)) = evtΘ1(φ(n));
4. n0 ≺0 n1 implies φ(n0) ≺1 φ(n1);
5. σ(N0) ⊆ N1;
6. σ(U0) ⊆ U1;
7. t ∈ U0 implies φ(Ok0(t)) ⊆ Ok1(σ(t));
where Ok(t) is the set of nodes of events at which t originates. Item 7 says
the node at which an atom declared to be uniquely originating is preserved
by homomorphisms. Note that φ is a strand mapping, not a node mapping
as in [6].
3 Shape Analysis Sentences
Given the definitions in the previous section, the language L(P ) used for
shape analysis sentences is quite constrained. The signature for terms extends
the one used for the underlying message algebra with a sort Z. Variables of
this sort denote strands.
Security goals make use of protocol specific and protocol independent
predicates. For each role r ∈ P , there are strand length predicates and strand
parameter predicates. There are |r| unary length predicates P [r, h] : Z, with
1 ≤ h ≤ |r|. Relative to skeleton k, P [r, h](z) asserts that strand z in k is
an instance of r and has a length of at least h. For each variable x : S that
occurs in r, there is a binary parameter predicate P [r, x] : Z × S. Relative
to skeleton k, P [r, x](z, t) asserts that strand z in k is an instance of r in
which x is instantiated as t.
For each B ∈ {A, S,D}, there are unary predicates non : B and uniq : B.
non(t) asserts t is non-originating in k and uniq(t) asserts t uniquely originates
in k.
Let m be the length of the longest role in P . There are m2 binary prece-
dence predicates prec[i, j] : Z×Z for 0 ≤ i, j < m. prec[i, j](x, y) asserts that
node (x, i) is before node (y, j) in k. There are 3m binary origin predicates
orig[i] : B × Z, with 0 ≤ i < m and B as before. orig[i](t, z) asserts that t
uniquely originates in k at node (z, i). The predicate false has arity zero and,
of course, equality is binary.
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To improve the readability of formulas to follow, we write prec(x, i, y, j)
for prec[i, j](x, y) and orig(t, z, i) for orig[i](t, z).
We define K(k) = (Y,Φ), where Φ is k’s skeleton formula, and Y is
the formula’s declarations. Using the cpsa skeleton syntax presented in
Section 2, let k = kX(P, I,≺, N, U). The declarations Y is X augmented
with a fresh variable zs : Z for each strand s ∈ Dom(I). Let ≺
− be the
transitive reduction of ≺. The skeleton formula Φ of k is a conjunction of
atomic formulas composed as follows.
• For each s ∈ Dom(I), let I(s) = i(r, h, σ). Assert P [r, h](zs). For each
variable x ∈ Vars(r † h) and term t = σ(x), assert P [r, x](zs, t).
• For each (s, i) ≺− (s′, i′) with s 6= s′, assert prec(zs, i, zs′ , i
′)
• For each t ∈ N , assert non(t).
• For each t ∈ U , assert uniq(t).
• For each t ∈ U and (s, i) ∈ Ok(t), assert orig(t, zs, i).
Given a set of homomorphisms δi : k0 7→ ki, its shape analysis sentence is
S(δi : k0 7→ ki) = ∀X0(Φ0 ⊃
∨
i
∃Xi(∆i ∧ Φi)), (5)
whereK(k0) = (X0,Φ0). The same procedure producesXi and Φi for shape ki
with one proviso—the variables in Xi that also occur in X0 must be renamed
to avoid trouble while encoding the structure preserving maps δi.
The structure preserving maps δi = (φi, σi) are encoded in ∆i by a con-
junction of equalities. Map σi is coded as equalities between a message
algebra variable in the domain of σi and the term it maps to. Map φi
is coded as equalities between strand variables in Φ0 and strand variables
in Φi. Let Z0 be the sequence of strand variables freshly generated for k0,
and Zi be the ones generated for ki. The strand mapping part of ∆i is∧
j∈Dom(Θ) Z0(j) = Zi(φi(j)).
An example shape analysis sentence is displayed in Figure 3. A strand
length predicate P [r, h](z) is written rh(z) with the protocol left implicit,
and similarly for the strand parameter predicates.
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Semantics of Skeleton Formulas. Let k = kX(rl , P,Θ,≺, N, U). When
formula Φ is satisfied in skeleton k with order-sorted variable assignment α,
we write k, α |= Φ. For x : S ∈ X , α(x) is in the carrier set of AX for sort S.
For x : Z, α(x) ∈ Dom(Θ). We write α¯ when α is extended to terms in the
obvious way. When sentence Σ is satisfied in skeleton k, we write k |= Σ.
• k, α |= P [r, h](y) iff h ≤ |Θ(s)| and Θ(s) † h = σ ◦ r † h for some σ,
where s = α(y).
• k, α |= P [r, x](y, t) iff Θ(s) † h = σ ◦ r † h for some σ with σ(x) = α¯(t),
where s = α(y) and h is the smallest ℓ such that x occurs in r † ℓ.
• k, α |= prec(x, i, y, j) iff (α(x), i) ≺ (α(y), j).
• k, α |= non(t) iff α¯(t) ∈ N .
• k, α |= uniq(t) iff α¯(t) ∈ U .
• k, α |= orig(t, z, i) iff α¯(t) ∈ U and (α(z), i) ∈ Ok(α¯(t)).
• k, α |= y = z iff α¯(y) = α¯(z).
• k, α 6|= false.
Theorem 1. Let K(k0) = (X,Φ) and Σ = ∃X Φ. Sentence Σ is satisfied
in k iff there is a homomorphism from k0 to k, i.e. k |= Σ iff ∃δ δ : k0 7→ k.
This theorem corrects the first of the two main results from [6], as that
paper omits the orig predicate. A later paper includes the orig predicate [7],
using the symbol UnqAt.
Proof. For the forward direction, assume α is a variable assignment for the
variables in X such that k, α |= Φ, and let Z be the sequence of strand
variables constructed while generating Φ from k0. Then the pair of maps
δ = (α ◦ Z, α) demonstrate a homomorphism from k0 to k, i.e. each item in
the definition of a skeleton homomorphism in Section 2 is satisfied.
For the reverse direction, assume maps δ = (φ, σ) are such that δ : k0 7→ k.
Then the desired variable assigment is
α(x) =
{
φ(Z−1(x)) x ∈ Ran(Z)
σ(x) x ∈ Dom(σ).
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Deducing Security Goals. A shape analysis δi : k0 7→ ki is complete if for
each realized skeleton k, δ : k0 7→ k iff ∃i, δ
′ δ′ : ki 7→ k. There is an ongoing
effort to show that whenever cpsa terminates it produces a complete shape
analysis, however, preliminary analysis suggests that with the exception of
specially constructed, artificial protocols, cpsa’s output is complete. See
Appendix A for an example of a troublesome artificial protocol.
The next theorem captures the sense in which a shape analysis sentence
characterizes a complete shape analysis.
Theorem 2. Let δi : k0 7→ ki be a complete shape analysis. Then the shape
analysis sentence Σ = S(δi : k0 7→ ki) is satisfied in all realized skeletons k,
i.e. k |= Σ.
Proof. Shapes are minimal among realized skeletons, so there is no realized
skeleton in the image of k that is not in the image of one of the shapes.
Therefore, by Theorem 1, the negation of the hypothesis of the implication
is satisfied in all realized skeletons that are not in the image of k0, and the
disjunction is satisfied in the remaining realized skeletons.
Let Σ be the shape analysis sentence of a complete shape analysis and Ψ
be a security goal. If Σ ⊃ Ψ is a theorem in order-sorted first-order logic,
then Ψ is satisfied in all realized skeletons and its protocol achieves this goal.
Since ≺ is transitive, transitivity of prec can also be used to prove a
protocol achieves a goal. That is,
prec(x, i, y, j) ∧ prec(y, j, z, k) ⊃ prec(x, i, z, k).
4 Detailed Example
The simplified version of the Denning-Sacco key distribution protocol [4] due
to Bruno Blanchet is now revisited.
A→ B : {|{|s|}a−1|}b
B → A : {|d|}s
Symmetric key s is freshly generated, asymmetric keys a−1 and b−1 are un-
compromised, and the goal of the protocol is to keep data d secret. This
cpsa description of the protocol in Eq. 3, has an initiator and a responder
role.
init(a, b : A, s : S, d : D) = 〈+{|{|s|}a−1 |}b,−{|d|}s〉
resp(a, b : A, s : S, d : D) = 〈−{|{|s|}a−1 |}b,+{|d|}s〉
(6)
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k0 = kX({init(a0, b0, s0, d0), resp(a1, b1, s1, d1)}, Protocol
〈i(resp, 2, {a1 7→ a, b1 7→ b, s1 7→ s, d1 7→ d})〉, Instances
∅, Node orderings
{a−1, b−1}, Non-origination
{s}) Unique origination
where X = a, b : A, s : S, d : D
k1 = kY ({init(a0, b0, s0, d0), resp(a1, b1, s1, d1)}, Protocol
〈i(resp, 2, {a1 7→ a, b1 7→ b, s1 7→ s, d1 7→ d}),
i(init , 1, {a0 7→ a, b0 7→ b
′, s0 7→ s})〉
Instances
Note b0 7→ b
′ not b!
{(1, 0) ≺ (0, 0)}, Node orderings
{a−1, b−1}, Non-origination
{s}) Unique origination
where Y = a, b, b′ : A, s : S, d : D
δ1 = (〈0〉, {a 7→ a, b 7→ b, s 7→ s, d 7→ d})
Figure 2: Shape Analysis for Blanchet’s Protocol
The protocol was constructed with a known flaw for expository purposes,
and as a result the secret is exposed due to an authentication failure. The
desired authentication goal is:
∀a, b : A, s : S, d : D, z0 : Z(
resp2(z0) ∧ respa(z0, a) ∧ respb(z0, b) ∧ resps(z0, s) ∧ respd(z0, d) ∧
non(a−1) ∧ non(b−1) ∧ uniq(s) ⊃ ∃z1 : Z(init1(z1) ∧ init b(z1, b)))
that is, when the responder (B) runs to completion, there is an initiator (A)
that is using b for the encryption of its initial message.
To investigate this goal, we ask cpsa to find out what other regular
behaviors must occur when a responder runs to completion by giving cpsa
skeleton k0 in Figure 2. cpsa produces shape k1 that shows that an initiator
must run, but it need not use the same key to encrypt its first message. The
shape analysis sentence for this scenario is displayed in Figure 3. Needless
to say, the authentication goal cannot be deduced from this sentence due to
the man-in-the-middle attack. If one repeats the analysis using the protocol
in Eq. 2, the generated shape analysis sentence can be used to deduce the
authentication goal.
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∀a0, b0 : A, s0 : S, d0 : D, z0 : Z(
resp2(z0) ∧ respa(z0, a0) ∧ respb(z0, b0) ∧ resps(z0, s0) ∧ respd(z0, d0) ∧
non(a−10 ) ∧ non(b
−1
0 ) ∧ uniq(s0)
⊃
∃a1, b1, b2 : A, s1 : S, d1 : D, z1, z2 : Z(
z0 = z1 ∧ a0 = a1 ∧ b0 = b1 ∧ s0 = s1 ∧ d0 = d1 ∧ resp2(z1) ∧
respa(z1, a1) ∧ respb(z1, b1) ∧ resps(z1, s1) ∧ respd(z1, d1) ∧
init1(z2) ∧ inita(z2, a1) ∧ initb(z2, b2) ∧ inits(z2, s1) ∧ orig(s1, z2, 0) ∧
prec(z2, 0, z1, 0) ∧ non(a
−1
1 ) ∧ non(b
−1
1 ) ∧ uniq(s1)))
Figure 3: Shape Analysis Sentence for Blanchet’s Protocol
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a method for extracting a sentence that completely
characterizes a run of cpsa and showed that logical deduction can then be
used to determine if a security goal is satisfied. To ensure the fidelity of the
translation between cpsa output and a shape analysis sentence, an order-
sorted first-order logic is employed. Furthermore, the first-order language
used for formulas is dictated by the cpsa syntax for skeletons and the for-
malization of homomorphisms used by cpsa.
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A Artificial Protocol
This section presents an example of a protocol that causes cpsa to fail to
produce a complete shape analysis.
init(a : A, d : D) = 〈+{|d|}a,−d〉
resp(x : ⊤, d : D) = 〈−x,+d〉
(7)
The initiator in the protocol specifies half of a common authentication
pattern. Assuming nonce d is freshly generated, and key a−1 is uncompro-
mised, an execution of the protocol in which an instance of the initiator role
runs to completion must include other regular behavior by a strand that
possesses the decryption key a−1.
It’s the responder role that is artificial. Its first event is the reception of
a message of any sort, and then it transmits a message of sort data. There
are many ways in which an instance of the responder role can serve as the
other half of the authentication pattern, such as:
init resp
•

{|d|}a
// ≺
{|d|}a
// •

• ≻doo •doo
or
init resp
•

{|d|}a
// ≺
({|d|}a,{|d|}a)
// •

• ≻doo •doo
· · · (8)
Yet consider an operational interpretation of the responder strand in
Eq. 8. The role states that it first receives a message without knowing its
structure, but the strand interprets that message as something it can decrypt
and extracts the nonce. Formalizations based on an operation semantics,
such as what is used for the Protocol Composition Logic [3], exclude the ex-
ecutions in Eq. 8, but there in nothing in strand space theory that prohibits
those executions.
B Node-Oriented Shape Analysis Sentences
The language L¯(P ) used for node-oriented shape analysis sentences more in
tune with the language described in [7]. The signature for terms extends the
one used for the underlying message algebra with a sort N, the sort for nodes.
Security goals make use of protocol specific and protocol independent
predicates. For each role r ∈ P and i < |r|, there is a protocol specific unary
position predicate P [r, i] : N. For each role r ∈ P and variable x : S that
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occurs in r, there is a protocol specific binary parameter predicate P [r, x] :
N× S. The protocol independent unary predicates are non : B and uniq : B
for each atomic sort B ∈ {A, S,D}. The predicate false has arity zero. The
remaining protocol independent predicates are binary, and are orig : B × N,
sprec : N× N, prec : N× N, and equality.
Soon we define K(k) = (Y,Φ), where Φ is k’s skeleton formula, and Y is
the formula’s declarations, but first we define the relevant nodes of a skele-
ton N . Let k = kX(P, I,≺, ν, υ) and let ≺
− be the transitive reduction of ≺.
Recall that ΘX is the strand space defined by I. The relevant nodes of k are
N = Ns ∪N≺ ∪Nυ where
Ns = {(s, i) | s ∈ Dom(ΘX) ∧ i = |ΘX(s)| − 1}
N≺ = {(s, i) | (s
′, i′) ∈ nodes(ΘX) ∧ s 6= s
′
∧((s, i) ≺− (s′, i′) ∨ (s′, i′) ≺− (s, i))}
Nυ = {(s, i) | t ∈ υ, (s, i) ∈ Ok(t)}
For K(k) = (Y,Φ), the declarations Y is X augmented with a fresh vari-
able of sort N for each node in N , and let v(n) be the variable associated
with node n.
The formula Φ is a conjunction of atomic formulas composed as follows.
• For each (s, i) ∈ N , assert P [r, i](v(s, i)), where I(s) = i(r, h, σ).
• For each s ∈ Dom(I), let I(s) = i(r, h, σ). For each variable x ∈
Vars(r † h) and term t = σ(x), assert P [r, x](v(s, h− 1), t).
• For each (s, i), (s, i′) ∈ N such that i < i′, assert sprec(v(s, i), v(s, i′)).
• For each (s, i) ≺− (s′, i′) such that s 6= s′, assert prec(v(s, i), v(s′, i′)).
• For each t ∈ ν, assert non(t).
• For each t ∈ υ, assert uniq(t).
• For each t ∈ υ and node n such that n ∈ Ok(t), assert orig(t, v(n)).
Given a set of homomorphisms δi : k0 7→ ki, its shape analysis sentence is
S(δi : k0 7→ ki) = ∀X0Φ0 ⊃
∨
i
∃Xi∆i ∧ Φi, (9)
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whereK(k0) = (X0,Φ0). The same procedure producesXi and Φi for shape ki
with one proviso—the variables in Xi that also occur in X0 must be renamed
to avoid trouble while encoding the structure preserving maps δi.
The structure preserving maps δi = (φi, σi) are encoded in ∆i by a con-
junction of equalities. Map σi is coded as equalities between a message alge-
bra variable in the domain of σi and the term it maps to. Map φi is coded
as equalities between node variables in Φ0 and node variables in Φi. Let v0
be the node variables freshly generated for k0, and vi be the ones generated
for ki. The strand mapping part of ∆i is∧
(s,j)∈Dom(v0)
v0(s, j) = vi(φi(s), j).
Semantics of Skeleton Formulas. Let k = kX(rl , P,Θ,≺, N, U). When
formula Φ is satisfied in skeleton k with order-sorted variable assignment α,
we write k, α |= Φ. For x : S ∈ X , α(x) is in the carrier set of AX for sort S.
For x : N, α(x) ∈ nodes(Θ). We write α¯ when α is extended to terms in the
obvious way. When sentence Σ is satisfied in skeleton k, we write k |= Σ.
• k, α |= P [r, i](y) iff α(y) = (s, i), and for some σ,
ΘX(s) † i+ 1 = σ ◦ r † i+ 1.
• k, α |= P [r, x](y, t) iff α(y) = (s, i), x occurs in r † i+1, and for some σ
with σ(x) = α¯(t),
ΘX(s) † i+ 1 = σ ◦ r † i+ 1.
The interpretation of the protocol independent predicates is straightfor-
ward.
• k, α |= prec(y, z) iff α(y) ≺ α(z).
• k, α |= sprec(y, z) iff α(y) ≺ α(z), α(y) = (s, i), and α(z) = (s, i′).
• k, α |= non(t) iff α¯(t) ∈ ν.
• k, α |= uniq(y) iff α¯(t) ∈ υ.
• k, α |= orig(t, y) iff α¯(t) ∈ υ and α(y) ∈ Ok(α¯(t)).
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∀a0, b0 : A, s0 : S, d0 : D, n0 : N
resp1(n0) ∧ respa(n0, a0) ∧ respb(n0, b0)
∧ resps(n0, s0) ∧ respd(n0, d0)
∧ non(a−10 ) ∧ non(b
−1
0 ) ∧ uniq(s0)
⊃
∃a1, b1, b2 : A, s1 : S, d1 : D, n1, n2, n3 : N
n0 = n1 ∧ a0 = a1 ∧ b0 = b1 ∧ s0 = s1 ∧ d0 = d1
∧ resp1(n1) ∧ respa(n1, a1) ∧ respb(n1, b1)
∧ resps(n1, s1) ∧ respd(n1, d1) ∧ resp0(n2)
∧ init0(n3) ∧ inita(n3, a1) ∧ init b(n3, b2) ∧ inits(n3, s1)
∧ orig(s1, n2) ∧ prec(n3, n2) ∧ sprec(n2, n1)
∧ non(a−11 ) ∧ non(b
−1
1 ) ∧ uniq(s1)
Figure 4: Node-Oriented Shape Analysis Sentence for Blanchet’s Protocol
• k, α |= y = z iff α¯(y) = α¯(z).
• k, α 6|= false.
The node-oriented shape analysis sentence equivalent to the one in Fig-
ure 3 is in Figure 4.
Since ≺ is transitive, transitivity of prec can be used to prove a protocol
achieves a goal. That is,
prec(x, y) ∧ prec(y, z) ⊃ prec(x, z).
Furthermore, sprec(x, y) ⊃ prec(x, y).
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